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 Turkey is a multi-ethnic and multi-denominational country with a republican tradition 
based on a constitution underlining the values of equality, freedom, and secularism. 
However, Turkey faces various problems such as the right to be different, and the lack of 
equal access to education. In this regard, Turkey has a very intricate history with regard to 
the culture of tolerance. The Ottoman millet system praised the act of tolerance during the 
heydays of the Ottoman Empire, while the nationalist rhetoric promoted a homogeneous 
nation based on Sunni-Muslim-Turkish elements.  
 The emphasis made on religion in the Turkish national education has never changed. 
The integration of secularism and religion was perceived to be the main goal of the 
curriculum by the nation-builders. However, the objectives of citizenship education show 
some differences in the history of the Republic. For instance, the primary school curriculum 
of 1926 stated its objective as ‘raising good citizens’, the 1929 curriculum as ‘raising people, 
physically and psychologically fit to be Turkish citizens’, and the 1936 program as ‘raising 
republican, statist, secular, revolutionary citizens’.  
 Turkish national education curriculum has always promoted a civic education based 
on the celebration of the Sunni-Islam-Turkish culture. It has been very difficult for the non-
Sunni-Muslim-Turkish students to publicly express their identities in school as well as having 
their practical claims about their ethno-cultural and religious difference accommodated by 
the state. Research on the minorities reveals the aggravation experienced by non-Muslim, 
non-Sunni, and non-Turkish students in everyday life.  Although ethno-cultural and religious 
identities are now being expressed rather freely in the public space, there are still barriers 
before the expression of one’s ethno-cultural and religious identity. 
This research illustrates the ways in which cultural and religious diversity has been 
accommodated in Turkey with a special focus on the response of Alevis to the compulsory 
courses on religious culture and morality in primary and secondary schools, and on the ban 
on headscarf in higher education institutions.  
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Evidence & Analysis (Key Findings) 
CASE 1. Alevis’ Responses to the curricular changes in compulsory 
courses on religious culture and morality 
 
While investigating the Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s 
initiative to accommodate the Alevi claims with respect to the changes 
in the curriculum of compulsory courses on religious culture and 
morality, it was revealed that the Alevis have generated two separate 
discursive positions: a) Groups who are content with the willingness of 
the ruling party (AKP) to include the Alevi belief and practices in the 
curriculum of compulsory courses; and b) Groups who believe that this 
initiative is an attempt to Sunnify the Alevis through a discourse of 
tolerance.  
The term tolerance was specifically mentioned in the Religious 
Culture and Morality textbooks with reference to the Medina 
Constitution, formulated by Prophet Mohammad to regulate 
relationships with non-Muslims, and Mohammad’s ‘tolerant attitude’ 
towards the Christians of Yemen. Furthermore, in September 2010, the 
Ministry of National Education released a public statement in the first 
week of the school year 2010-2011 to underline the need for the 
‘education of values’. Accordingly, the education of values such as 
citizenship, hospitality, solidarity and tolerance aims at empowering 
individual students against the challenges posed in everyday life by the 
processes of globalization.  
In the mean time, the curriculum change made in 2007 and 2008 
brought about some changes with regard to Alevism. The new 
curriculum focused on different sects and diverse mystic interpretations 
of Islam. Alevism was mentioned among mystic interpretations as the 
main constitutive other of the course’s syllabus and was integrated into 
what is called ‘Turkish Sunni Islam’ in the book. This implies that 
Alevism was perceived and exposed by the authors of the book as a part 
of the Sunni Islam with some deviations. This intervention in the 
textbook was interpreted by several Alevi parents as a form of 
assimilation, and it was taken to the courts. This mistake has been 
corrected now together with the publication of the new books in the new 
academic year of 2011-2012. Accordingly, Alevism is mainly explained 
through its relationship with Islam. 
The governments’ initiative for the revision of the curriculum to 
include the Alevi belief and practices has failed to respond to religious 
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and cultural diversity challenges posed by the Alevis with regard to the recognition of the 
Alevi belief and culture as a distinct and peculiar identity. We argue that although the 
government’s initiative can be regarded as an attempt to tolerate religious differences of the 
Alevis and the co-existence of Alevi children in school life with the Sunni majority, the 
inclusion of Alevi belief in the curriculum of the compulsory courses does not necessarily 
lead to the recognition of Alevi culture as a unique identity.  
Attempts made for the revision of the curriculum in the compulsory courses on 
religious culture and morality do not necessarily bring about respect and recognition for the 
Alevi culture as a distinct and peculiar identity in school life. However, it means to some 
Alevi groups that the participation of Alevi children is tolerated, and religious differences of 
the Alevis are accepted by means of incorporating Alevi belief into the curriculum and 
textbooks. This initiative cannot be regarded as a public policy, which effectively responds to 
the Alevi claims along with the respect and recognition of the Alevi identity in the framework 
of more rigorous problems/issues arising from the religious differences of Alevis in terms of 
their places of worship (cemeevi) and their alleged legal status within the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs. The issue of education on Alevi belief should be discussed in the public 
space, in relation to the freedom of faith in general.   
 
CASE 2- Lifting the Ban on Headscarf in Higher Education 
The public policies and political initiatives undertaken for the lift 
of the ban on headscarf in universities have so far been unsuccessful in 
making a substantial change in the national discourse of laicism in 
Turkey. These attempts have also been short of introducing a new 
discourse based on respecting and recognizing religious diversity in 
higher education. Referring to the interviews undertaken with several 
policy and civil society actors, our study shows that there is a common 
belief that the attempts made by the political parties have just been 
politicizing the headscarf issue without making any substantial 
improvement for the resolution of the ongoing problem. 
Most of the interlocutors regard the public policies and political 
initiatives proposed for the resolution of the headscarf issue in 
universities (by making new legal changes or by reinstating and 
enforcing the laws to re-assure the right to education) as palliative solutions. However, it 
was mostly claimed that in order to resolve this issue with an address to tolerance, respect 
and recognition, a more structural solution should be found on the basis of the right to 
freedom of religion. Accordingly, those interviewed have expressed their willingness to see a 
constitutional reform to clearly make sure that headscarf ban will no longer be an obstacle 
before the right to education of individuals, to precisely highlight the right to religious 
difference, and to prevent the politicization of the headscarf issue.  
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Evidence & Analysis (Key Findings) 
Laicism: Infidelity, or Piety? 
The most crucial impact of strict laicism in Turkey is that it polarizes and diffuses the 
society between laicists who comply with the state’s principles and interests, and Islamists 
who challenge the state and the regime with their social and individual preferences. As in 
the headscarf debate, the top-down modernization process run by the state has so far 
created believers of Laicism on the one hand, and believers of Islam on 
the other.  
Following the French model of laicité, the choice of the early 
Republicans on the integration of the principle of Laicism into the 
Turkish Constitution in 1937 indicates that the Kemalist elite was not 
preoccupied at all with the elimination of religion from public space. On 
the contrary, they affirmed the fact that Turkish society was religious in 
essence. The main rationale behind the principle of Laicism was not to 
wage war against Islam, but to provide the people with the power to 
challenge the rising authority of the Islamic clergy since the late 18th 
century. Laicism derives from the French word lai (or laique, in 
contemporary usage, lay people in English, or inananlar in Turkish), 
meaning “of the people” as distinguished from “the clergy”. Hence, 
laicism underscores the distinction between lay members of a church 
and its clergy. In other words, Laicism in a way rescued Islam as a 
matter of ‘belief’ and ‘conscience’ by institutionally supporting, 
financing, and promulgating a different version of Islam and its view of 
relation to power and social life.  
Secularism and Laicism 
The terms laicism and secularism are often interchangeably used in Turkey. Both 
terms rather have different etymologies, institutional histories, and normative theoretical 
implications. Secularism derives from the Latin saeculum, meaning generation or age, and 
originally meant “of the world” (dünyevi in Turkish) as opposed to “of the church” (ruhani in 
Turkish). Hence, the term “secular” differentiates between matters of religiosity and matters 
of the world. In this sense, secularization of a society simply refers to the “diminution of the 
social significance of religion” and “the growing tendency to do without religion”. A secular 
state then refers to a “religion-free” state - a kind of state that does not apparently comply 
with the modern Turkish state. In this sense, Laicism is actually a kind of obstacle to 
secularization as it has so far made the state to instrumentalise religion as a tool to control 
the masses. 
Laicist ideology has 
also made it possible 
that the Kemalist 
elite politically and 
culturally 
instrumentalised 
Islam to unify the 
nation through the 
institutions of the 
Ministry of 





Issue 2011/03_ p. 5 of 8 
                        
 
 
In this sense, rather than antagonizing Islam, laicism simply means to empower the individual 
believers vis-a-vis the clergy. Furthermore, laicist ideology has also made it possible that the 
Kemalist elite politically and culturally instrumentalised Islam to unify the nation through the 
institutions of the Ministry of Education and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The 
perception that Laicism was “antireligious secularism” ignores the regime’s religious policy, 
and fails to consider the existence of different versions of political Islam in Turkey, one of 
them enshrined in power until very recently and others outside it. 
Eventually, laicist/religious divide has so far been ideologically  
manipulated by both pro-liaicist and pro-Islamist political elites. The 
political obsession with religion, as displayed by both Laicism and 
Islamism, tends to distract the masses from social and economic 
problems by turning them into a rhetorical debate about existential and 
societal fears. One could clearly see that the theological and political 
debates around Laicism and Islamism cannot be isolated from the 
socioeconomic realities in which they are situated. The rise of an 
Islamic bourgeoisie with roots in Anatolian culture, the re-Islamization 
of society and politics in everyday life through the debates on headscarf 
issue and Alevism, the emergence of consumerist lifestyles not only 
among the secular segments of the Turkish society, but also among the 
Islamists, and finally the weakening of the legitimacy of the Turkish 
military as the guardian of national unity and the laicist order are all 
very important aspects of the ways in which the Turkish society and 
politics have radically transformed in the last two decades. Thus, one 
should certainly try to assess the social and political change in Turkey 
without falling into the trap essentializing the Laicist-Islamist divide. 
This research has partly revealed that both laicist and Islamist 
discourses have so far been used by Turkish political elite as two 
different forms of governmentality in order to conceal social, economic 
and political issues prevalent in the society by means of institutions, 
procedures, analyses, debates, and reflections. 
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 Key Messages for  Policy Makers 
  1. Tolerance vis-a-vis religious diversity is not being discussed with 
reference to the freedom of religion. The ideology of laicism has so far 
dominated all the relevant discussions about the public and private divide, the 
practice of religion in everyday life and the freedom of faith.  
 
 Policy makers should open up discussions on religious matters along 
with the freedom of religion instead of insisting on a laicist rhetoric.  
 
 Generating a debate on the freedom of religion could also contribute to 
the resolution of several other problems such as the historically loaded 
hostilities between Muslims and non-Muslim groups. Such a debate could also 
contribute to the generation of a public understanding, which perceives religious 
convictions as a matter of private domain.  
 
 It could also contribute to the de-securitization of the religion vs. 
secularism debate. 
 
                 2. Education on religious culture and morality in primary and secondary 
schools promotes Sunni Islam at the expense of disrupting social cohesion.  
 
 Curriculum of the compulsory courses on religion and ethics should be 
changed, and concentrate on the history and sociology of religions. Such a 
change could help creating a cohesive society in which no group would be 
feeling threatened by the hegemonic discourse of Sunni-Islam. 
 
         3. The Headscarf issue has become a symbolic fault line in Turkey 
separating the so-called religious and secular (laicist) groups. 
 
 Policy makers should not portray the term laicism as if it is against 
religion. Political and societal tension between the so-called Kemalists and the 
Islamists could be addressed by explaining that laicism aims at empowering the 
faithful citizens against the clergy rather than erasing religion altogether from 
public life. 
 
 Policy makers should refer not only to tolerance (hosgörü) in settling the 
cultural and religious conflicts but also give credit to the notions of respect, 
recognition, pluralism, equality and justice in order to create a cohesive society. 
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Data Collection: This study is based on literature review as well as field work. We have 
collected relevant data and information about the two cases through a study on NGO 
reports, policy documents, public statements, internet news and a wide range of books and 
articles enlisted in the academic literature. Fieldwork was conducted between the end of 
February and mid-April 2011, the work was written in May and June 2011. We have 
conducted nineteen semi-structured qualitative interviews, nine of which were conducted on 
the first case (compulsory courses on religious culture and morality), and ten of which were 
conducted on the second case (the lift of the ban on headscarf in universities).  
 
Indepth Interviews: Among these interviews, thirteen were conducted with experts 
including civil society leaders, policy makers, politicians, bureaucrats, and academics and 
six with practitioners and other stakeholders such as teachers, students, and parents. Most 
of the interviews were conducted in Istanbul, while four of them were held in Ankara with 
policy makers, politicians and bureaucrats. The final part of the field work was accomplished 
with a focus group discussion held in July 2011. A group of journalists, civil society leaders, 
practitioners and headscarfed lawyers had a heated debate on both cases.  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA): The data collected through the interviews were 
evaluated on the basis of the interlocutors’ reflections on some common denominators such 
as tolerance, Europeanization, religion, secularism and laicism. These interviews were 
analyzed through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method. CDA is a method of discourse 
analysis focusing on the investigation of the relations between discourse and social/cultural 
developments in everyday life. It views discursive practices as an important form of social 
practice contributing to the constitution of the social and cultural world including social 
identities and relations.  
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Acronym: ACCEPT PLURALISM 
Title: Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the 
Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe 
 
Short Description: ACCEPT PLURALISM questions how much cultural diversity can be 
accommodated within liberal and secular democracies in Europe. 
The notions of tolerance, acceptance, respect and recognition are 
central to the project. ACCEPT PLURALISM looks at both native and 
immigrant minority groups. 
Through comparative, theoretical and empirical analysis the project 
studies individuals, groups or practices for whom tolerance is sought 
but which we should not tolerate; of which we disapprove but which 
should be tolerated; and for which we ask to go beyond toleration 
and achieve respect and recognition. 
In particular, we investigate when, what and who is being not 
tolerated / tolerated / respected in 15 European countries; why this is 
happening in each case; the reasons that different social actors put 
forward for not tolerating / tolerating / respecting specific minority 
groups/individuals and specific practices. 
The project analyses practices, policies and institutions, and 
produces key messages for policy makers with a view to making 
European societies more respectful towards diversity. 
 
Website: www.accept-pluralism.eu   
Duration: March 2010-May 2013 (39 months) 
Funding Scheme: Small and medium-scale collaborative project 
EU contribution: 2,600,230 Euro, Grant agreement no. 243837 
Consortium: 19 partners (15 countries) 
Coordinator: European University Institute (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies) 
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EC officer:  Ms Louisa Anastopoulou, Project Officer 
 
 
